Showing posts with label Kurds. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kurds. Show all posts
Wednesday, September 12, 2012
Iraq’s Kurdistan Suffering From Rising Expectations, New Survey Shows Rising Dissatisfaction With Services And Corruption
By, Joel Wing
Kurdistan is one of the most prosperous parts of Iraq. It has a better business environment then the rest of the country, thriving trade with Iran and Turkey, although it is mostly one way with the Kurds importing large amounts of consumer goods and foodstuffs, and stability due to the domination of the two ruling parties over politics, the economy, and security. The growing wealth in the region has led to increased expectations amongst the people. That has recently been shown in a Gallup poll that showed widespread dissatisfaction amongst Kurds with services and corruption, even higher than in the rest of the country.
Gallup found that more and more Kurds were unhappy with their situation. The Gallup organization interviewed 700 people over three years in Kurdistan. Amongst the questions asked of them, three were about services in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and a fourth was on corruption. One was whether people were satisfied with public transportation. In 2010, 46% said they were happy. That went up to 54% in 2011, before dropping to 23% in March 2012. Another was whether people were satisfied with the availability of housing. In 2010, 47% said they were, going up to 53% in 2011, before taking a large fall to 30% in 2012. When it came to corruption, 37% thought it was widespread in the KRG in 2009, 52% in 2010, 61% in 2011, and 81% in 2012. Only with education was there a different trend with 55% saying they were satisfied in 2010, going up to 64% in 2011, and only seeing a slight drop to 61% in 2012. These results show a dramatic turn around in Kurdish public opinion. The KRG has long portrayed itself as the “other Iraq” where the populace is safe and content. The 2010 to 2011 responses on services and corruption, showed that general trend. However, in 2012, all but education saw complete reverses.
Are you satisfied with education, housing, and public transportation in the Kurdistan Regional Government?
Is corruption widespread throughout the country?
Many of these turnarounds could have been predicted. There has been a construction boom in houses in cities like Irbil in recent years. Many of these however, have been high priced western style single family homes in exclusive areas. Many average Kurds cannot afford them, and are only open to government bureaucrats and party officials. This has distorted the market, raising prices, while excluding the majority. The same could be said for corruption. There were months of public protests in the first half of 2011 in Sulaymaniya. One of the driving forces behind these outbursts was the belief that the two ruling parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were involved in graft, bribery, and crooked business deals. The KRG has thus gone through something of a sea change in public perceptions of both the economic opportunities that are open to them, and the willingness to criticize their leaders. With all the talk of the rise of Kurdistan many people seem to be now asking about why specific issues like public services, housing, and corruption have not improved.
American Village housing development in Irbil (Overseas Property Mall)
Levels of discontent amongst Kurds in 2012 were even higher than in the rest of Iraq. When it came to corruption for instance, in 2009 only 37% of Kurds surveyed believed it was a major issue, compared to 79% in the rest of the country. By 2010, the difference between the two had narrowed to 61% saying it was a problem in Kurdistan versus 73% in the other parts of the nation. Finally, in early 2012, the two opinions had flipped flopped with 81% of Kurds and 67% of other Iraqis expressing their displeasure with corruption. Likewise with perceptions of public transportation views went from 54% saying they were satisfied in Kurdistan in 2011 to just 23% in 2012, while in the rest of Iraq it went from 37% to 50%. Again, this showed that many Kurds are unhappy with their situation, and are demanding more of their government. It’s especially surprising, because on issues like corruption, Baghdad has done as little as the KRG to address the issue, yet it is seen as more of a problem in the latter.
Comparison of dissatisfaction with services Kurdistan vs Rest of Iraq 2011-2012
The Kurdistan Regional Government appears to be suffering from a wave of rising expectations. People there can see the boom in business and construction in the major cities, and feel like they should be benefiting from this growth. The reality seems to be seeping in that the benefits are not being evenly distributed. That is causing the resentment shown in the March 2010 public opinion poll by Gallup. It could cut into the standing of the two ruling parties, unless they put real effort into addressing some of these issues. Already, the PUK has seen a decided loss in its base with the creation of the opposition party the Change List. The KDP has seen no serious challenge to its standing, but it could face the brunt of the public’s mood change in the future. This could be said of the country as a whole, where increased security, and a return to a sense of normality for many is leading people to want more services, jobs, and opportunities, meaning that politicians have to really govern for the first time since 2003, because other issues like the insurgency are not as pressing as before. This will be a real test, because many officials in both Baghdad and Irbil are not used to meeting public demand other than through patronage systems, which are only aimed at their followers to sustain their support. It will be an interesting few years to see if the central and regional governments can adapt to this changing environment.
SOURCES
Dagher, Sam, “As Baghdad grapples with Sadr City, Iraqi Kurdistan busily builds ‘Dream City,’” Christian Science Monitor, 5/7/08
Dyke, Joe, “DEPRESSION IN KURDISTAN / Iraqi Kurdistan: Death of an Uprising,” Al-Akhbar, 5/29/12
Kareem, Dashti, “erbil’s building boom: favouring the rich, neglecting the poor,” Niqash, 8/4/11
Loschky, Jay, “In Iraqi Kurdistan, Satisfaction With Infrastructure Crumbles,” Gallup, 9/7/12
Mackinnon, Mark, “Corruption: The Dark Underbelly of Kurdistan’s Dream,” Globe And Mail, 3/12/07
Mandalawi, Sazan, “erbil’s unrestrained building boom causes conflicting emotions,” Niqash, 9/14/11
Kurdistan is one of the most prosperous parts of Iraq. It has a better business environment then the rest of the country, thriving trade with Iran and Turkey, although it is mostly one way with the Kurds importing large amounts of consumer goods and foodstuffs, and stability due to the domination of the two ruling parties over politics, the economy, and security. The growing wealth in the region has led to increased expectations amongst the people. That has recently been shown in a Gallup poll that showed widespread dissatisfaction amongst Kurds with services and corruption, even higher than in the rest of the country.
Gallup found that more and more Kurds were unhappy with their situation. The Gallup organization interviewed 700 people over three years in Kurdistan. Amongst the questions asked of them, three were about services in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and a fourth was on corruption. One was whether people were satisfied with public transportation. In 2010, 46% said they were happy. That went up to 54% in 2011, before dropping to 23% in March 2012. Another was whether people were satisfied with the availability of housing. In 2010, 47% said they were, going up to 53% in 2011, before taking a large fall to 30% in 2012. When it came to corruption, 37% thought it was widespread in the KRG in 2009, 52% in 2010, 61% in 2011, and 81% in 2012. Only with education was there a different trend with 55% saying they were satisfied in 2010, going up to 64% in 2011, and only seeing a slight drop to 61% in 2012. These results show a dramatic turn around in Kurdish public opinion. The KRG has long portrayed itself as the “other Iraq” where the populace is safe and content. The 2010 to 2011 responses on services and corruption, showed that general trend. However, in 2012, all but education saw complete reverses.
Are you satisfied with education, housing, and public transportation in the Kurdistan Regional Government?
Is corruption widespread throughout the country?
Many of these turnarounds could have been predicted. There has been a construction boom in houses in cities like Irbil in recent years. Many of these however, have been high priced western style single family homes in exclusive areas. Many average Kurds cannot afford them, and are only open to government bureaucrats and party officials. This has distorted the market, raising prices, while excluding the majority. The same could be said for corruption. There were months of public protests in the first half of 2011 in Sulaymaniya. One of the driving forces behind these outbursts was the belief that the two ruling parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were involved in graft, bribery, and crooked business deals. The KRG has thus gone through something of a sea change in public perceptions of both the economic opportunities that are open to them, and the willingness to criticize their leaders. With all the talk of the rise of Kurdistan many people seem to be now asking about why specific issues like public services, housing, and corruption have not improved.
American Village housing development in Irbil (Overseas Property Mall)
Levels of discontent amongst Kurds in 2012 were even higher than in the rest of Iraq. When it came to corruption for instance, in 2009 only 37% of Kurds surveyed believed it was a major issue, compared to 79% in the rest of the country. By 2010, the difference between the two had narrowed to 61% saying it was a problem in Kurdistan versus 73% in the other parts of the nation. Finally, in early 2012, the two opinions had flipped flopped with 81% of Kurds and 67% of other Iraqis expressing their displeasure with corruption. Likewise with perceptions of public transportation views went from 54% saying they were satisfied in Kurdistan in 2011 to just 23% in 2012, while in the rest of Iraq it went from 37% to 50%. Again, this showed that many Kurds are unhappy with their situation, and are demanding more of their government. It’s especially surprising, because on issues like corruption, Baghdad has done as little as the KRG to address the issue, yet it is seen as more of a problem in the latter.
Comparison of dissatisfaction with services Kurdistan vs Rest of Iraq 2011-2012
The Kurdistan Regional Government appears to be suffering from a wave of rising expectations. People there can see the boom in business and construction in the major cities, and feel like they should be benefiting from this growth. The reality seems to be seeping in that the benefits are not being evenly distributed. That is causing the resentment shown in the March 2010 public opinion poll by Gallup. It could cut into the standing of the two ruling parties, unless they put real effort into addressing some of these issues. Already, the PUK has seen a decided loss in its base with the creation of the opposition party the Change List. The KDP has seen no serious challenge to its standing, but it could face the brunt of the public’s mood change in the future. This could be said of the country as a whole, where increased security, and a return to a sense of normality for many is leading people to want more services, jobs, and opportunities, meaning that politicians have to really govern for the first time since 2003, because other issues like the insurgency are not as pressing as before. This will be a real test, because many officials in both Baghdad and Irbil are not used to meeting public demand other than through patronage systems, which are only aimed at their followers to sustain their support. It will be an interesting few years to see if the central and regional governments can adapt to this changing environment.
SOURCES
Dagher, Sam, “As Baghdad grapples with Sadr City, Iraqi Kurdistan busily builds ‘Dream City,’” Christian Science Monitor, 5/7/08
Dyke, Joe, “DEPRESSION IN KURDISTAN / Iraqi Kurdistan: Death of an Uprising,” Al-Akhbar, 5/29/12
Kareem, Dashti, “erbil’s building boom: favouring the rich, neglecting the poor,” Niqash, 8/4/11
Loschky, Jay, “In Iraqi Kurdistan, Satisfaction With Infrastructure Crumbles,” Gallup, 9/7/12
Mackinnon, Mark, “Corruption: The Dark Underbelly of Kurdistan’s Dream,” Globe And Mail, 3/12/07
Mandalawi, Sazan, “erbil’s unrestrained building boom causes conflicting emotions,” Niqash, 9/14/11
Tuesday, September 11, 2012
International Crisis Group Report
Turkey: The PKK and a Kurdish Settlement
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Turkey’s Kurdish conflict is becoming more violent, with more than 700 dead in fourteen months, the highest casualties in thirteen years. Prolonged clashes with militants in the south east, kidnappings and attacks on civilians suggest hardliners are gaining the upper hand in the insurgent PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party). The government and mainstream media should resist the impulse to call for all-out anti-terrorist war and focus instead, together with Kurds, on long-term conflict resolution. There is need to reform oppressive laws that jail legitimate Kurdish politicians and make amends for security forces’ excess. The Kurdish movement, including PKK leaders, must abjure terrorist attacks and publicly commit to realistic political goals. Above all, politicians on all sides must legalise the rights most of Turkey’s Kurds seek, including mother-language education; an end to discriminatory laws; fair political representation; and more decentralisation. Turkey’s Kurds would then have full equality and rights, support for PKK violence would drop, and the government would be better placed to negotiate insurgent disarmament and demobilisation.
The government has zigzagged in its commitment to Kurds’ rights. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) initiated a “Democratic Opening” in 2005, but its commitment faltered in 2009. At times, AKP leaders give positive signals, including scheduling optional Kurdish lessons in school and agreeing to collaborate in parliament with other parties on more reforms. At others, they appear intent on crushing the PKK militarily, minimise the true extent of fighting, fail to sympathise with Kurdish civilian casualties, openly show their deep distrust of the Kurdish movement, do nothing to stop the arrest of thousands of non-violent activists and generally remain complacent as international partners mute their criticism at a time of Middle East turmoil.
Contradictory signals have also come from the Kurdish movement, including leaders of legal factions and the PKK, which is condemned in Turkey and many other countries as a terrorist organisation. They have made conciliatory statements, tried to stick to legal avenues of association and protest in the European diaspora and repeatedly called for a mutual truce. At the same time, few have disavowed the suicide bombings, car bombs, attacks on civilians and kidnappings that have increased in 2012. Hardliners promote the armed struggle, radical youth defy more moderate leaders, and hundreds of young men and women volunteer to join the insurgency. European and U.S. counter-terrorism officials still accuse the PKK of extortion and drug dealing. Mixed messages have convinced mainstream public opinion that Turkey’s Kurds seek an independent state, even though most just want full rights within Turkey. The Kurdish movement needs to speak with one voice and honour its leaders’ commitments, if it is to be taken seriously in Ankara and its grievances are to be heard sympathetically by the rest of the country.
Finding the way to a settlement is hard, as terrorist attacks continue and the PKK mounts increasingly lengthy offensives. Turmoil in neighbouring Syria, where a PKK-affiliated group has taken control of at least one major Kurdish area near the border with Turkey, worries Ankara and may be inflating the insurgents’ sense of power. Some on both sides are talking again of winning militarily and seem to have accepted many hundreds of dead each year as the cost, even though after nearly three decades of inconclusive fighting, public opinion among Turks and Kurds alike increasingly concedes that military action alone will not solve their mutual problem.
What has been missing is a clear conflict resolution strategy, implemented in parallel with measured security efforts to combat armed militants, to convince Turkey’s Kurds that their rights will be gradually but convincingly extended in a democratising Turkey. Now is a good time for this to change. An election (presidential) is not expected for two years. A new constitution is being drafted. The AKP has a secure parliamentary majority. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan should seize the opportunity to champion democratic reforms that would meet many of the demands voiced by most of Turkey’s Kurds. This would not require negotiations with the PKK, but the prime minister should engage with the legal Kurdish movement, take its grievances into account and make it feel ownership over reforms.
Major misapprehensions exist on the question of what the Kurdish movement is and what it wants. The actions recommended below would move the conflict closer to resolution than military operations alone.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To establish an environment for progress
To the Turkish government and the leaders of the Kurdish movement:
1. Work toward a ceasefire, urge insurgents to stop attacks, avoid large-scale military operations, including aerial bombings, and stand up to pressure for ever-stronger armed responses.
2. Urge the PKK to rein in factions that attack and kidnap civilians, plant bombs and trash property or throw Molotov cocktails in demonstrations, and to pledge not to use a ceasefire to rearm, resupply or relocate. The security forces must limit aggressive crowd control methods, including tear or pepper gas, to an absolute minimum.
Even in the absence of a ceasefire
3. Address the legitimate, broad demands of Kurdish society for mother-language education, the lowering of national election thresholds, more decentralised local government and removal of discriminatory ethnic bias in the constitution and laws.
4. Change the Anti-Terror Law, Penal Code and other legislation to end the practices of indefinite pre-trial detention and prosecution of thousands of peaceful Kurdish movement activists as “terrorists”, and ensure that non-violent discussion of Kurdish issues is not punished by law.
5. Help inform public opinion about the international legitimacy of multi-lingualism in education, ethnic diversity and wider powers for local government.
6. Use the parliament and, in particular, its constitutional reform commission to facilitate discussion between political parties on reform and assure wide buy-in.
7. Make public a package of measures for reintegration and retraining of former Kurdish insurgents, once the time comes to agree on full demobilisation.
To leaders of the Kurdish movement:
8. Clarify what reforms Kurds want in language, education and public life; codify ideas for decentralisation or devolution; identify precisely which laws and constitutional articles should be changed; commit to these reforms, advocate for them in parliament and make a determined effort to explain them to mainstream Turkish opinion.
9. Stop demanding a “self-defence militia” in Kurdish-speaking areas, end any kind of illegal political organisation in Turkey that could be construed as a parallel state and remain committed to ending the fighting and disbanding insurgent units.
To Turkey’s allies and friends, notably the U.S., Canada, UK, Ireland and Spain:
10. Engage with the Turkish government and opinion leaders to share experiences of defusing ethnic, linguistic, and regional tensions, including through travel programs for officials, politicians and opinion-makers from all relevant sides and parties in Turkey.
11. Continue to encourage Turkey to abide by its international commitments to protection of minority rights, freedom of expression and access to a fair trial without extended periods of pre-trial detention.
Istanbul/Brussels, 11 September 2012
Download Full Report Here
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Turkey’s Kurdish conflict is becoming more violent, with more than 700 dead in fourteen months, the highest casualties in thirteen years. Prolonged clashes with militants in the south east, kidnappings and attacks on civilians suggest hardliners are gaining the upper hand in the insurgent PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party). The government and mainstream media should resist the impulse to call for all-out anti-terrorist war and focus instead, together with Kurds, on long-term conflict resolution. There is need to reform oppressive laws that jail legitimate Kurdish politicians and make amends for security forces’ excess. The Kurdish movement, including PKK leaders, must abjure terrorist attacks and publicly commit to realistic political goals. Above all, politicians on all sides must legalise the rights most of Turkey’s Kurds seek, including mother-language education; an end to discriminatory laws; fair political representation; and more decentralisation. Turkey’s Kurds would then have full equality and rights, support for PKK violence would drop, and the government would be better placed to negotiate insurgent disarmament and demobilisation.
The government has zigzagged in its commitment to Kurds’ rights. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) initiated a “Democratic Opening” in 2005, but its commitment faltered in 2009. At times, AKP leaders give positive signals, including scheduling optional Kurdish lessons in school and agreeing to collaborate in parliament with other parties on more reforms. At others, they appear intent on crushing the PKK militarily, minimise the true extent of fighting, fail to sympathise with Kurdish civilian casualties, openly show their deep distrust of the Kurdish movement, do nothing to stop the arrest of thousands of non-violent activists and generally remain complacent as international partners mute their criticism at a time of Middle East turmoil.
Contradictory signals have also come from the Kurdish movement, including leaders of legal factions and the PKK, which is condemned in Turkey and many other countries as a terrorist organisation. They have made conciliatory statements, tried to stick to legal avenues of association and protest in the European diaspora and repeatedly called for a mutual truce. At the same time, few have disavowed the suicide bombings, car bombs, attacks on civilians and kidnappings that have increased in 2012. Hardliners promote the armed struggle, radical youth defy more moderate leaders, and hundreds of young men and women volunteer to join the insurgency. European and U.S. counter-terrorism officials still accuse the PKK of extortion and drug dealing. Mixed messages have convinced mainstream public opinion that Turkey’s Kurds seek an independent state, even though most just want full rights within Turkey. The Kurdish movement needs to speak with one voice and honour its leaders’ commitments, if it is to be taken seriously in Ankara and its grievances are to be heard sympathetically by the rest of the country.
Finding the way to a settlement is hard, as terrorist attacks continue and the PKK mounts increasingly lengthy offensives. Turmoil in neighbouring Syria, where a PKK-affiliated group has taken control of at least one major Kurdish area near the border with Turkey, worries Ankara and may be inflating the insurgents’ sense of power. Some on both sides are talking again of winning militarily and seem to have accepted many hundreds of dead each year as the cost, even though after nearly three decades of inconclusive fighting, public opinion among Turks and Kurds alike increasingly concedes that military action alone will not solve their mutual problem.
What has been missing is a clear conflict resolution strategy, implemented in parallel with measured security efforts to combat armed militants, to convince Turkey’s Kurds that their rights will be gradually but convincingly extended in a democratising Turkey. Now is a good time for this to change. An election (presidential) is not expected for two years. A new constitution is being drafted. The AKP has a secure parliamentary majority. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan should seize the opportunity to champion democratic reforms that would meet many of the demands voiced by most of Turkey’s Kurds. This would not require negotiations with the PKK, but the prime minister should engage with the legal Kurdish movement, take its grievances into account and make it feel ownership over reforms.
Major misapprehensions exist on the question of what the Kurdish movement is and what it wants. The actions recommended below would move the conflict closer to resolution than military operations alone.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To establish an environment for progress
To the Turkish government and the leaders of the Kurdish movement:
1. Work toward a ceasefire, urge insurgents to stop attacks, avoid large-scale military operations, including aerial bombings, and stand up to pressure for ever-stronger armed responses.
2. Urge the PKK to rein in factions that attack and kidnap civilians, plant bombs and trash property or throw Molotov cocktails in demonstrations, and to pledge not to use a ceasefire to rearm, resupply or relocate. The security forces must limit aggressive crowd control methods, including tear or pepper gas, to an absolute minimum.
Even in the absence of a ceasefire
3. Address the legitimate, broad demands of Kurdish society for mother-language education, the lowering of national election thresholds, more decentralised local government and removal of discriminatory ethnic bias in the constitution and laws.
4. Change the Anti-Terror Law, Penal Code and other legislation to end the practices of indefinite pre-trial detention and prosecution of thousands of peaceful Kurdish movement activists as “terrorists”, and ensure that non-violent discussion of Kurdish issues is not punished by law.
5. Help inform public opinion about the international legitimacy of multi-lingualism in education, ethnic diversity and wider powers for local government.
6. Use the parliament and, in particular, its constitutional reform commission to facilitate discussion between political parties on reform and assure wide buy-in.
7. Make public a package of measures for reintegration and retraining of former Kurdish insurgents, once the time comes to agree on full demobilisation.
To leaders of the Kurdish movement:
8. Clarify what reforms Kurds want in language, education and public life; codify ideas for decentralisation or devolution; identify precisely which laws and constitutional articles should be changed; commit to these reforms, advocate for them in parliament and make a determined effort to explain them to mainstream Turkish opinion.
9. Stop demanding a “self-defence militia” in Kurdish-speaking areas, end any kind of illegal political organisation in Turkey that could be construed as a parallel state and remain committed to ending the fighting and disbanding insurgent units.
To Turkey’s allies and friends, notably the U.S., Canada, UK, Ireland and Spain:
10. Engage with the Turkish government and opinion leaders to share experiences of defusing ethnic, linguistic, and regional tensions, including through travel programs for officials, politicians and opinion-makers from all relevant sides and parties in Turkey.
11. Continue to encourage Turkey to abide by its international commitments to protection of minority rights, freedom of expression and access to a fair trial without extended periods of pre-trial detention.
Istanbul/Brussels, 11 September 2012
Download Full Report Here
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